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Two Cheers for Universalism:
Nortefs Nifty Novelty
John A E Pottmr*

I. INTRODUCTION
Individuals in the cross-border bankruptcy community
hi ding under rocks may not have heard about the
monumental decisions in the co-trials in the Canadian
United States Nortel bankruptcy proceedings, In re Nortel
Netirorks, Inc and Re Nortel Netirnrks Corp. 1 The decisions are
thoughtful, innovative, practical, and important. They warrant
a detailed case comment or two in their own right. This brief
article, however, will not provide such worthy treatment. 2
Those hungering for in-depth reports of the cases and their
holdings may stop reading now and devote their labours
elsewhere. What this article 1ri//be is an appreciation of Nortel,
explaining both why it is such an important opinion, or pair of
opinions, for the cross-border bankruptcy world and why it
should be seen as a triumph, albeit an incremental one, for the
universalist school of transnational insolvency. 3
*

2

3

John A E Pottow. John Philip Dawson Collegiate Professor of Law.
University of Michigan Law School. James Robinson. Michigan JD
Class of 2016, provided research assistance. and the referees
provided comments. All arc appreciated.
In re Nortel Netirnrks. Inc. 532 BR 494 ( Bankr D Del 2015 ): Re
Nortel Net1rnrk.1· Corp. 2015 ONSC 2987 (Ont SCJ [Commercial
List]).
Others have taken up the charge. Sec. eg. Robert Harlang & Mitch
Vininsky. ··Nortel Networks: A New Twist on Substantive Con
solidation?" (2015). 34 Am Bankr Inst J 18. 66 ("The Nortel
allocation case was unique in many respects and resulted in
decisions that demonstrated the respective judges· understanding
of the business world and their creativity.").
The reader is presumed to know the well-rehearsed international
bankruptcy debates between the competing theories of "territorial-
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II. THE NORTEL CASES

2. The No,-tel Proceedings

1. The Nortel Enterprise

When Nortel first started to skid, reorganization was
attempted, but the onslaught of the Great Recession
hammered any lingering nails into its coffin. The company
soon filed for bankruptcy protection. But it did not do so in the
paradigmatic way anticipated by the dominant international
instruments regulating cross-border insolvency proceedings,
such as most notably, the UNICITRAL Model Law on Cross
Border Insolvency 5 implemented in Canadian law through the
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA/ 1 and US law
through Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code. 7 That is, there
was not a "main" proceeding filed in Nortel's COMI (Canada)
and "ancillary" proceedings in the myriad other countries
around the world where Nortel also had establishments.
Rather, Nortel filed "parallel" proceedings in both Canada
and the United States. 8 The filings were coordinated and
simultaneous. To be specific, Nortel was not one mega
corporation that filed multiple parallel bankruptcy
proceedings in different jurisdictions around the world:
Nortel filed its various proceedings chiefly by affiliation.
That is, the main parent and Canadian operating subsidiary
filed in Canada, the US operating subsidiary filed in the United
States, and so on. Some entities stayed out of formal court

"Nortel", made up of Nortel Networks, Inc and Nortel
Networks Corp, was an enormous telecommunications
company of storied pedigree that foundered in the Great
Recession. Although global in reach, one can fairly call it a
"Canadian" company. Like many multinational business
enterprises ("M BE"), it had, by definition, its tentacles well
extended worldwide, but if anyone tried to assess the centre of
main interests ("COMI") of the corporate group, it would
likely have been Canada. As is often the case with such
Canadian businesses, however, a considerable portion of its
affairs were transacted in the United States ("US"), which
produced the lion's share of its revenue. Most relevant for
present purposes is that a significant component of Nortel's
business was dependent upon intellectual property. The history
and business model of Nortel, including its multiple product
and service lines, is well recounted in both the Canadian and US
bankruptcy court opinions; the curious reader is referred to
either source for more detail. 4

4

ism" and --universalism" as the preferred normative models for
resolving multinational failures. While territorialism counsels
following strict sovereign borders in allocating regulatory jurisdic
tion among nations over globally dispersed assets, universalism
embraces a one-law approach: the application of one --exporting"
country"s bankruptcy law cxtraterritorially to other .. receiving"
jurisdict1om,. John A E Pottow .. Procedural Incrementalism: A
.
Model for International Bankruptcy"
(2005). 45 Va. J lilt 'I 935, 937
[Pottow. --1ncrementalism··i.
See supra note I. For flavour: as of January 2009, Nortel's lines of
business were ··carrier networks ... wireless networking solutions for
providers of mobile voice. data and multimedia communications
services over technologies; .. enterprise solution�" enterprise com
.
munications solutions addressing the headquarters.
branch and
homes office needs
of
large
and
small
businesses;
and
--metro
.
cthcrnct networks. . optical networking and carrier grade ethernet
data networking solutions. /11 re Nortel Netirorks. Inc. 532 BR at
503.

5
6
7
8

UNCITRAL. UNCITRAL Model Lmr 011 Cross-Border lmolrenc_r
with Guide to Enactment and lllterpretation (New York: UN. 2014)
[Model Law].
Companies· Creditors Arrangement Act. RSC 1985. c C-36. as
amended to 26 February 2015 [CCAA].
US Bankruptcy Code. 11 USC* 1501 et seq [US Bankruptc_r Code].
While they arc not the paradigmatic format. the Model Law
anticipates parallel procedures. Sec Model Law. supra note 5. Part
Two (A)(2); sec also US Bankruptcy Code. supra note 7. * 1528
(providing for parallel proceedings). Nortel also filed parallel
..
proceedings in the United Kingdom ("'UK ). Israel. and France.
Sec Management ·.1 Disrnssion and Analysis o( Financial Condition
and Results of" Operations fiir the Year Ended Decemher JI. :!OI I.
Nortel Network:,, (22 March 2012). online: < http: www .nortcl
canada.com,wp-contcnt uploads,2011 11 NNL-2011-Annual-Rc
port-MDA.pdf>.
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proceedings altogether. 9 Nortel, through multiple debtors in
multiple proceedings, "went into bankruptcy".
As mentioned, the starts at reorganization ultimately
sputtered. Not helping was inter-corporate squabbling over
transfer payments, which are the tax-animated headaches that
arise when one corporate affiliate pays another for intra
enterprise transactions, all designed to assuage tax watchdogs
that tax evasion through income flight is not afoot. 10 The
Canadian debtors also demanded financing from the US
9
10

One example is Nortel Networks SA. a French company.
From the late 1970s to 31 December 2000, Nortel operated under a
�cries of Cost Sharing Agreements ("CSA"), which were bilateral
agreement� between the Canadian parent, Nortel Networks Limited
("NNL "). and each of the other R&D-performing Nortel entities.
The purpose of these CSA was effectively to implement transfer
pricing by allocating costs to re�pective corporate affiliates across
the globe (and hence dictate the net taxable income for each such
affiliate).It was never a smooth process at Nortel. For example, the
last R&D CSA between NNL and the main US subsidiary, Nortel
Nctworb. Inc ("NNI"), was drafted in 1996 and made effective
from I January 1992. to reflect the terms of a 1996 advanced pricing
agreement ("'APA") between NNL, NNI. the Canadian Revenue
Agency ("CRA"). the taxing authority and the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS"), the US tax authority. At the end of 1999, however,
each of the three CSA APA in effect between NNL and each of the
other then-cost sharing participants ("CSP") (namely, those gov
erning R&D, tangible property, and headquarters cost sharing) had
expired or wa� nearing expiration. In December 2001, Nortel's
R&D CSA was terminated. Accordingly, from December 2001
through March 2002, the Nortel tax group worked with external
advisors to craft the specific mechanics of a residual profit sharing
method ("RPSM") for Nortel that could be submitted simulta
neously to the CRA. IRS and Inland Revenue, the UK taxing
authority, as the basis for proposed APA for the 2000 to 2004
period. It culminated in the Master Research and Development
Agreement ("M RDA") that later came to be so litigated in the
Nortel bankruptcy.Indeed, over the course of eight years (2001-08),
as APA negotiations with the tax authorities dragged on regarding
Nortel"s RPSM, the individual entities ("IE"') made or received
billions of dollars in transfer pricing payments under that system. In
2009, following Nortel"s insolvency and more than seven years after
the 2002 APA applications. the IRS and CRA finally directed an
income adjustment of US$2 billion from NNL to NNI as a

subsidiaries, contending that the financing was necessary to
11
fund any sort of reorganization attempt. But eventually, the
writing revealed itself on the walls, and talk turned to
liquidation.
In an enterprise the size of Nortel, liquidation can mean
anything from depressing auctions of office chairs to highly
integrated cross-border sales of intact business lines subsumed
within larger corporate groups. The Nortel stakeholders
hungered for the latter. In an omnibus resolution of some of
the inter-corporate financing bickering, the various Nortel
debtors entered into a protocol to cooperate in the sale of the
firms' assets. 12 This protocol, significantly, recognized that
trying to resolve the inter-corporate squabbles would delay and
even jeopardize the value-maximizing sale of the corporate
assets, and so the consensus was reached to sell all of the viable
business lines collectively and put the proceeds into an
evocatively labeled "lockbox". 13 Disbursing the lockbox's
proceeds was left for a later day, after all the stakeholders had
pulled together and beat the bushes for bidders. This protocol
was successfully entered and survived appeal. 14
The lockbox approach proved successful. After the
major business lines were sold off, the debtors were even
able to monetize their "rump" portfolio of around 7,000
11
12

13

14

condition for resolving the APA for those years. In re Nortel
Netirnrks. Inc. 532 BR 494, 507-9 (Bankr D Del 12 May 2015).
/11 re Nortel Netirnrks. Inc. 532 BR at 502: Re Nortel Net1rnrk1· Corp.
2015 CarswcllOnt 7072 (Ont SCJ [Commercial List]). paras 29-30.
"Interim Funding and Settlement Agreement" (visited 20 September
2015). onlinc: < http: bankrupt.com misc Norte IIntcrimFundin
gAgrccment.pdf> [!FSA]. The !FSA settled the inter-corporate
tax claim at USS2 billion. Sec supra note 10. The !FSA was later
finalized into the Final Canadian Funding and Settlement Agree
ment. /11 re Nortel Netirnrks. Inc. 532 BR at 511-12: Re Nortel
Netll'ork.l· Corp. 2015 Carswcl!Ont 7072 at para 33.
/hid at 11: "[T]hc entire amount of the Sale Proceeds ...shall be
deposited in an escrow account pursuant to an escrow agreement.
the terms of which shall be negotiated and agreed by all Selling
Debtors. in each case acting reasonably."
In re Nortel Netirnrks. Inc. 737 F 3d 265 (3d Cir 2013).
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patents. 15 So attractive were these IP assets that Nortel
flirted with staying around as a sort of patent portfolio
business, but ultimately decided to sell off those assets,
too. 16 Google arrived as a stalking horse for $900 million
and served as a catalyst to jack up a final bid of $3 billion
by a syndicate known as "Rockstar". 17 All through, the
sale of assets netted $7 billion or so to the lockbox. 18
So far, so good; everyone agreed to pull together to sell assets
for their greatest value and make the pie as big as possible. But
then, as in many matters commercial, when it came time to
divide the pie. things went less well. Despite a provision of the
protocol counseling mediation over how to divide the proceeds
amongst the three bankruptcy estates Canada, US, and
collectively, Europe, Middle East, and Africa ("EMEA"),
consensual allocation proved fruitless, much to the dismay of
the hapless mediators. 19 Judicial determination, the backstop
resolution procedure under the protocol, then had to be
invoked. 20

15
16
17
18
19

20

/11 re Nortel Net1rorks. Inc, 532 BR at 518; Re Nortel Netl\'orks Corp,
2015 CarswellOnt 7072 para 39.
/11 re Nortel Net11'0rks. Inc. 532 BR at 514-15; Re Nortel Networks
Corp. 2015 CarswellOnt 7072 para 105.
Rockstar is a consortium comprising Apple. Ericsson. Microsoft,
Blackberry. EMC. and Sony. /11 re Nortel Netll'orks. Inc. 532 BR at
502.
$7.3 billion. to be precise. Ibid at 525.
··tn no case shall there be any distribution from the Escrow Account
in advance of either (i) agreement of all of the Selling Debtors or (ii)
in the case where the Selling Debtors fail to reach agreement,
determination by the relevant dispute resolver(s) . . . ." IFSA at 11.
[E]ach Party .. . agrees to submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of
the US and Canadian Courts (in a joint hearing conducted under
the Cross-Boarder Protocol adopted by such Court. as it may be in
effect from time to time). for purposes of all legal proceedings to th�
extent relating to the matters agreed in [the IFSA]. Ibid at 15.
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3. The Nortel Decisions
i. Background
The protocol provided for joint judicial resolution of the
contested lockbox allocation. But joint judicial resolution is a
strange beast, and there was no e.Y ante reason to expect orderly
harmonization of those two judicial proceedings in Canada and
the United States absent the protocol or the force of the Model
Law. Neither was a main proceeding in the jurisdictional
hierarchy anticipated by the typical main/ancillary format of
the Model Law that would be presumptively entitled to
cooperation from the other proceeding. Thus, the parties
were venturing out into uncharted terrain. It could very well be
that the Canadian court would render its own decision on the
assets, which might conflict with the US court's determination.
Indeed, the prospect of conflicting distributive determinations
is not just a Nervous Nellie's nightmare; in the In re lernout &
Hauspie Speech Prod\· bankruptcy, the US and Belgian courts
came to diametric interpretations on the priority rights of
aggrieved investors who had fraud claims against the debtor,
which but for eventual settlement would have been a
jurisprudential disaster. 21
The Nortel courts avoided disaster. They did so by invoking
the procedures of the Model Law that facilitate cooperation as
implemented through the protocol. 22 So, for example, the trial
21

22

Sec John A E Pottow. ··Greed and Pride in International Bank
ruptcy: The Problems of and Proposed Solutions to ·Local
.
Interests ., (2006) 104 Mich L Rn 1899. discussing the Lemo111 &
Hauspie bankruptcy [Pottow. "'Greed and Pride""]; sec also /11 re
Lemout & Hauspie Speech Prods. NV. 301 BR 651. 655 (Bankr D
Del 2003) ("'providing longer explication of the facts"').
Model Law. supra note 5. arts 25-27; US Bankruptcr Code. supra
note 7. §§ 1525-27; CCAA. supra note 6. ss 52; cf Bob Wessels &
Miguel Virgos. £11roprn11 Co1111111111irntio11 and Cooperation Guide
lines for Cross-horder /11soh-e11cr (July 2007). onlinc: < http:
www.insol.org. lNSOLfaculty pdfs BasicRcading Scssion ° o205
Europcan%20Communication °/4,20and%20Coopcration'½,20Gui
dclinc�%20for¾20Cross-bordcr%201nsolvcncy%20.pdf> [CoCo
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on how to allocate the lockbox proceeds was run in two
different courtrooms in Toronto, Ontario and Wilmington,
Delaware simultaneously, with the judges engaged in frank and
frequent communications between themselves.23 Witnesses
were video-linked from one courtroom to the other, and
litigants in each venue could see in live time what was afoot in
the other. But as the respective courts made clear, each judge
would arrive ultimately at his own determination on what the
applicable bankruptcy law demanded for allocation of the
lock box proceeds across jurisdictional borders. 24

Ill

LI�

■

!:Mf.�

■

Canada

3 ·.

�
�

ii. The parties· competing a/location proposals
While coordinated and integrated, the proceedings were still
woolly. The parties advanced sharply divergent approaches of
how best to allocate the lockbox proceeds. Surprising perhaps
no one, the parties' positions were, as one judge aptly
characterized, '"self-serving". 25 Proving the adage that a
picture says a thousand words, the US Court graphically
demonstrated how each constituency's approach to dividing
the spoils just so happened to accord its members the largest
share.26

23

24

25
26

Guideline!->] (elaborating recommendations for cross-border insol
vency cases).
..The Courts have had discussions following the trial of the
allocation dispute in an effort to avoid the travesty of reaching
contrary results which would lead to further and potentially greater
uncertamty and delay." /11 re Nortel Networks. Inc, 532 BR at 532.
!hid at 556 C[T]he US Court and the Canadian Court indepen
dently arrived at the same conclusion."'); Re Nortel Netll'orks Corp,
2015 CarswellOnt 7072 (Ont SCJ [Commercial List]), para IO ("We
have come to this conclusion in the exercise of our independent and
exclusive jurisdiction in each of our jurisdictions."').
.. [T]he self-�erving allocation positions of the Canadian Interests,
the US Interests and the EMEA Debtors are not determinative or
helpful." /11 re Nortel Nefll'orks. l11c, 532 BR at 532.
/hid at 522; ..The Court compares the Allocation Dispute to three
people trying to reach the top of a mountain by pulling the others
down. In other words, no one gets to the top."' /hid at 556.

Canada
legal Ownership

U.S. Beneficial
Ownership/Revenue

EMEA
Contribution

Perhaps, in a way, the naked self-interest of the parties
liberated the judges to blaze their own trail. which they did
when rejecting all the party-advocated approaches in coming to
their own allocation rule.
As mentioned, a considerable part of Nortel's global assets
were tied up in patent portfolios, and so the question became
how should the bankruptcy estates share in the proceeds
realized upon the sale of those portfolios? Of course, the
simplest solution would have been obtained were there only one
bankruptcy estate, or perhaps even one main bankruptcy
estate: all the money would go into that one pot. Unfortunately,
the multi-jurisdictional parallel proceeding posture of Nortel
made that simple outcome impossible. Each constituency made
its own pitch, boiled down into three major positions as typified
by the arguments of the Canadian, EMEA, and US debtors. 27
The formalist position was advanced by the Canadians, who
argued that all the intellectual property was owned by the
Canadian entities, and so the sale of that property should
27

The only parties who made a full-hearted pro rata pitch were the
UK pension claimants. Wilmington Trust advocated a pro rata
approach. but only as an alternate theory to its primary argument.
/hid at 530.
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naturally inure to the benefit of the Canadian estate. The
EMEA stakeholders took a somewhat Lockean approach and
argued that because the legal title to the intellectual property
was parked in Canada for arbitrary (or more precisely, tax
related) reasons. allocating all the lockbox value based on that
legal location would be unfair if not absurd, especially in light of
Nortel's worldwide operations. Rather, they argued, the
allocation should match the means of production, or perhaps
factors of production if Research & Development ("R&D")
expenditures is a proper proxy: because much of the worldwide
R&D effort that occurred to generate those Canadian
intellectual assets occurred in Europe and elsewhere, the
proceeds from those assets' sales should be allocated in
proportion to each jurisdiction's share of the R&D spending. 28
Finally, the US interests partially joined the EMEA position
in rejecting the Canadian debtor's "ownership" approach but
veered off onto their own proposal, which might be called an
"economic" approach. This tack was built upon the premise
that the purpose of the intellectual property nominally owned
by the Canadian entities was to generate money for a once
profitable worldwide business, and the US affiliates brought in
the lion's share of that business. As such, the sale proceeds
should be allocated in proportion to the respective affiliates'
contribution to the global conglomerate's income. 29
The courts' decision, independently reached but surely
preceded by Model Law-sanctioned communication, was to
28

29

/hid at 54 7-48: Re Nortel Net1rork.1· Corp. 2015 CarswellOnt 7072,
paras 64-66. The EMEA alternatively argued (in an argument that
went nowhere) that the residual profit entities ("'RPE") should have
ownership of the IP under common law principles ..by reason of the
IP belonging to the RPE that employed the inventors". Re Nortel
Net1rnrk.l Corp. 2015 CarswellOnt 7072. para 186. Under the
MORA. each Licensed Participant vested legal titled in NNL to the
IP it created in exchange for which NNL granted an exclusive
license back to each Lice�sed Participant. In I� re Nortel Networks,
file. 532 BR at 510.
In re Nortel Neflrnrks. Inc. 532 BR at 548-49: Re Nortel Networks
Corp. 2015 CarswellOnt 7072. para 65.
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reject all these approaches and adopt a novel alternative that
they called a modified pro rata allocation. 30 The pot was
divided in proportion to total creditors' claims.
iii. The mod(fied pro rata allocation solution: pro rata

Before explaining the courts' approach, it is first helpful to
situate the outcome at the highest level of abstraction, and that
is that the courts rejected the formalism of the Canadian
approach and adopted a much more functional, even
pragmatic lens toward Nortel's assets. That is, the "biggest
picture" underpinning of the courts' opinions was to reject the
idea that legal title of the intellectual property assets held in
Canada entitled the Canadian estate to the proportionate
proceeds of the lockbox, let alone the lockbox proceeds related
to the business line sales. Rather, the courts accepted the
principle of the other creditors, if not each calculation metric
itself, that such an approach would shower a windfall upon the
Canadian estate that did not reflect the economic substance of
the R&D and other inter-connected operational aspects of this
global firm. 31 This departure from focus on physical location in
30
31

In re Nortel Net1rnrks. Inc, 532 BR at 549-60: Re Nortel Net1rnrks
Corp, 2015 CarswellOnt 7072. paras 193-249.
In re Nortel Netll'orks. Inc. 532 BR at 533: ..The Canadian Debtors

are nothing short of narcissistic in allocating the bulk of the Sales
Proceeds to themselves and in their failure to recognize the
contributions of the other Nortel companies and the realities of
the manner in which the Nortel enterprise operated on a day-to-day
basis." Re Nortel Nefll'ork.l· Corp. 2015 CarswellOnt 7072. paras
196-97:
In so far as the IP is concerned. while the patents were registered in the
name of NNL. I would not for that reason hold that NNL is entitled to
the proceeds of the IP sales. The patents and application rights to apply
for patents were held in the name of IP for administrative purposes. It was
best practices in a multi-national enterprise to have all patents assigned to
one company. in this case to NNL. as explained by Ms. Anderson and Ms.
De Walton. and made management of the portfolio much easier. While
these witnesses expressed subjective views that it was NNL who owned the
patents. these views arc not determinative. as acknowledged in the
Monitor"s reply brief at paras 65-66. This was not one corporation and
one set of employees inventing IP that led to patents. Nortel was a highly
integrated multi-national enterprise with all RPEs doing R&D that led to
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itself is a shattering repudiation of the doctrine of territorialism,
a point to be explored below, but the main observation for
present discussion is that the courts went beyond asset
ownership in crafting an equitable solution to allocation.
Once that door had been opened, one can conjecture it
became relatively simple to craft an allocation formula: sharing
in the pot was not based on the debtors' budget or revenue as
had been self-servingly proposed, but equally by creditor,
invoking a "fundamental tenet" of bankruptcy law in the words
of one court. 32 This is the meaning behind the courts' pro rata
allocation decision. In other words, if the total value of the
claims in the Canadian estate were $1, and the total claims in the
EMEA estate also $1, and the total in the US estate were $2,
meaning that there would be $4 of worldwide claims, the courts
would order distribution of the lock box 25% to Canada and
EMEA each and 50% to the United States. 33 The result of this
was to acknowledge everyone worldwide contributed to the
value of Nortel as an M BE and that the conceit of trying to craft
each constituency's precise, perfectly calibrated share was a
fool's errand. It is interesting to speculate that if the non
Canadian estates had offered less self-serving counter
formulae, whether one might have taken root, but that is
likely unanswerable. In the end, once recognizing that the
Canadians could not take it all and opening the door to
worldwide participation, the deep-seated bankruptcy baseline
of pro rata equality was difficult to shake. Perhaps viewed

32
33

patents being granted. It wa, R&D that drove Nortel's business. R&D
and the 111tcllcctual property created from it was the primary driver of
Nortel', \ aluc and profits. All part1c, agree on that. // 1rn11/d unjustly
<'llrich N,VL to dC'prirc all of' lh<' olhff RPl:'.1· o/' lh<' 1rnrk that the,1 did in
cru11i11g lh<' IP .111s1 h1·rn11s1• 1he p111e111.1 11·ere rC'gis1ered in NNL'.1• name.
(Emphasi, added).

.. It is a fundamental tenet of im,olvency law that all debts shall be
paid pari pas.1·11 and all unsecured creditors receive equal treatment."
Re Nortel Net1rnrk.1· Corp. 2015 Carswel!Ont 7072, para 209.
.. The allocation each Debtor Estate will be entitled to receive from
the lockbox fund� is the percentage that all accepted claims against
that Estate bear to the total claims against all Debtor Estates." Ibid
at para 250.
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another way, no party made a sufficiently compelling case why
the distribution should not be pro rata in light of the courts'
desires to share the allocation beyond Canada.
iv. The mod(fied pro rata allocation solution: mod(fication
Without more, this approach could be described as "pro
rata," period. But there was more, because this presumptively
pro rata approach was purportedly "modified". And indeed,
the courts went at times to awkward pains to protest that they
were most definitely not engaging in pro rata or consolidated
distribution of corporate assets. 34 The courts insisted this was
not true pro rata allocation, but rather mod(fied pro rata
allocation, for two reasons, one accurate and one more
confused. First, the courts explained this was not fully pro
rata allocation because they were leaving some assets
unallocated by the pro rata approach, in other words, just
letting those assets lay where they be. Namely, cash on hand in
each respective estate was left just where it was territorially. 35
Territorialism's random lottery of where cash happens to be
parked on the day of filing was thereby vindicated, and each
estate that happened to have cash or did not, enjoyed a
respective windfall or disappointment. For illustration of the
tempers this approach engenders, see generally Lehman
Brothers. 36 No real attempt was made by either court to
defend this outcome intellectually, so perhaps it might just be
seen as a combination of (a) administrative ease, and/or (b) an
easy, if arbitrary, way to rebut the "seemingly offensive"
allegation that they were engaged in fully pro rata sharing by
creditors. 37 Whatever the motivation, the distinct treatment of
34

35

36
37

"[Both courts] agree that their methodology does not constitute
global substantive consolidation." In re Nortel Nenrorks, Inc. 532
BR at 551.

!hid.
In re Lehman Bros Special Fin Inc 1· BN Y Corpornte Tr Sefl's Ltd (111
re Lehman Bros Holdings Inc), 422 BR 407 (Bankr SONY 2010).
The discussion of pro rata allocation requires a discussion of

substantive consolidation and. more importantly. why the Court's
approach is not that seemingly offensive outcome ...The Court. for
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cash on hand was indeed a modification of the otherwise
governing pro rata allocation formula.
As just partially presaged, the second reason the courts
insisted this was not a fully pro rata allocation rests upon an
apparent terror with being accused of effecting a substantive
consolidation of the debtors' estates, which apparently was
seen as a consequence of fully pro rata allocation. 38 The US
Court was especially fearful of this allegation, the Canadian
Court less so. In fact. the Canadian Court cheerfully launched
into an alternative discussion saying that even (/" pro rata
allocation was substantive consolidation, that remedy would
be fully indicated under Canadian law on the facts of the case. 39
But the US Court would have none of it. Indeed, more broadly,
the US Court was anxious to assure that it was not adopting
"universalism", presumably an unwelcome cognate to
substantive consolidation. 40

Annual Rel'iew <f /11solve11cy Law I 347

difficult to grasp fully the Courts' reasoning, or even direction,
it might help simply to break the logical chain that universalism
need equate to substantive consolidation. Whether pro rata
allocation equates with substantive consolidation is a separate
issue explored below. Recall that universalism in its pluralist
form42 advocates the disposition of a multinational debtor's
assets in accordance with the substantive bankruptcy law of its
COMI. 43 Universalism, or more precisely, its advocates, has
not definitively figured out how to address interwoven
corporate groups where multiple corporate debtors within a
broader group have different COMI. Universalism thus has
nothing conclusive to say on the doctrine of substantive
consolidation of corporate debtors. 44 To be sure, squishing all
the affiliates together into one giant "enterprise" and finding
that enterprise's COMI, or "E-COMI", in the literature, 45 for

The source of the Courts' concerns is hard to pin down, and
these comments may not reflect one coherent argument so
much as a collection of stray thoughts. The confusion stems in
part from a conflation of pro rata allocation with substantive
consolidation and/or both with universalism. 41 Because it is

38
39

40
41

one. is not ordering payments to the .. most deserving"' creditors as
the Bondholders fear. The Court is not ordering a distribution
�chcmc. lm,tcad. the Court is directing an allocation among the
Estates for the fatales to distribute in an appropriate manner. It is a
distinction with a difference.
In re Nortel Netirorks. Inc. 532 BR at 556.
Sec ihid.
··Even if it could be said that a pro rnta allocation involved
substantive consolidation. which it cannot. I do not see case law
precluding it in the unique circumstances of this international case.
Even in domestic cases. CCAA plans involving substantive
consolidation arc not unknown." Re Nortel Netll'orks Corp, 2015
CarswcllOnt 7072.at para 214.
·To be dear. the Court's pro rnta allocation is not the ·new order'
which the pro rnta proponcnb urge with terms such as ·universal
ism"'. In re Nortel Netirorks. Inc.532 BR at 558.
For example. the courts note that they were recognizing inter
corporate debt. In re Nortel Netll'ork,1·. Inc. 532 BR at 532; Re Nortel

42

43
44
45

Netll'orks Corp. 2015 CarswellOnt 7072 para 214, which indeed
would be ignored in applying the doctrine of substantive consolida
tion. In re Nortel Netirorks, Inc. 532 BR at 532: Re Nortel Netirorks
Corp. 2015 CarswellOnt 7072 para 214. But that simply speaks to
whether pro rnta allocation is tantamount to substantive consolida
tion (suggesting that it might be). It has nothing to do with
universalism. which is indifferent to inter-corporate debt.
In its purest conceptual form, universalism aspires to the harmo
nization of one worldwide. substantive law of bankruptcy. The most
common model of universalism. however. follows a pluralist route.
Sidestepping the issue of which substantive provisions the ideal
bankruptcy law would possess. it simply selects from one of the pre
existing bankruptcy regimes ex post. To the extent that other courts
are needed (to give legal force to the orders of the courts of the
governing jurisdiction), such courts could convene ancillary pro
ceedings designed to effectuate the controlling court's orders. The
current univcrsalist paradigm thus concedes the divergence of
present domestic bankruptcy laws and advocates only a pluralist
system of choice-of-law: its theory does not envision (or rely upon)
substantive harmonization of those bankruptcy laws.
Pottow, "lncrementalism", suprn note 3 at 948.
Ibid at 949.
See UNCITRAL. Legislatil'e Guide on 111.wi/J,('llc_r Lmr. part three:
Trrnt111e11t of enterprise groups in i11sofrenc_r, 38 111 Scss. UN Doc A
CN.9 WG.V/WP.92. 2010 [Legislative Guide].
See lrit Mevorach... Towards a Consensus on the Treatment of
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purposes of choice of substantive bankruptcy law would be a
form of universalism analogous to substantive consolidation.
But that E-COM I approach to corporate groups is not
compelled by universalism. 46 Indeed, while insisting upon an
E-COM I approach has been recommended by some
universalism advocates as the best approach to the corporate
groups problem, it has not been advocated, for lack of a better
term, universally. For example, a situation of discrete
corporate subsidiaries incorporated throughout different
jurisdictions without interwoven financial affairs could well
yield a universalist outcome subsidiary-by-subsidiary for each
entity's cross-border assets 1rit/10ut requiring substantive
consolidation at the E-COMI level. 47 In short, and contrary
to the Courts' seeming concerns, universalism is agnostic to
substantive consolidation.
There is not much point in getting bogged down in this aspect
of the Courts' opinions, however. Little turns on it, other than
revealing the Courts' respective disinclinations toward
substantive consolidation and at least one Court's apparent
contempt for universalism. 48 What matters more is the prior
point that cash on hand was preserved by estate irrespective of
proportionate creditor claims. That fact suffices to justify the
46
47
48

Multinational Enterprise Groups in Insolvency" (2010). 18 Cardo:o
J Int"/ & Comp L 359.
The most that could be said is that substantive consolidation is
'"harmonious" with a robust form universalism applied to corporate
groups.
Sec Legislative Guide. supra note 44.
'To be clear. the Court's pro rata allocation is not the 'new order'
which the pro raw proponents urge with terms such as 'universal
ism'". /11 re Nortel Networks. Inc, 532 BR 494. 558 (Bankr D Del 12
May 2015). The court's apparent dislike for universalism appears
premised on a misunderstanding that Chapter 15 of the US
Bankruptcy Code is not the enactment of the Model Law (which
of course. it is). Awkwardly. Judge Gross insisted: '"These cases are
not proceeding under the purview of the Model Law. which is purely
a propm,al at this time. These cases are proceeding under the
dictate� of Chapters 11 and 15 of the US Bankmptcy Code." Ibid at
559 (emphasis added). Thus. one might charitably chalk the court's
disdain up to confusion.
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label "modified" pro rata allocation, which the courts
accurately used.
v. The a/location/distribution distinction

Having jointly decided to take a modified pro rata approach
to allocating the lockbox proceeds was not the end of the
matter. The Courts' final step was to take the intriguing gesture
49
of distinguishing allocation from distribution. This distinction
is relevant for the debate between universalism and
territorialism for the straightforward reason that in true
universalism, the COM I state "exports" its substantive
distribution rules across national borders to govern local
asset distribution. Modified universalism tempers this
exportation with various carve-outs for exceptional
treatment. 50 Territorialism, by contrast, allows each
individual state to implement its own distributive rules to
assets within its jurisdiction. 51 By underscoring the allocation/
distribution distinction, the Nortel courts appeared to have
been mollifying territorialists by assuring that local substantive
bankruptcy rules would be alive and well to govern whatever
share of the lockbox proceeds ended up being patriated to the
respective jurisdictions under the modified pro rat a allocation.
In other words, Canadian bankruptcy law and priority rules
would govern the ranking of claims and distribution of the
modified pro rata share of the lockbox proceeds that went to
Canada, US rules to the piece sent to the United States, and so
forth. While this may seem like fine bologna to slice, the
sovereignty-animated distinction was unlikely to have been lost
on many. Territorialist concerns of local bankruptcy laws
49

50
51

'The Court is not ordering a distribution scheme. Instead. the
Court is directing an allocation among the Estates for the Estates to
distribute in an appropriate manner. It is a distinction with a
difference. The difference is that intcrcompany claims. settlements.
cash-on-hand will all be honored in the allocation." /hid at 555.
EC. Council Regulation( EC) 1346 2000 of JC) May ]()()() 011
insofrenc_r proceedings. (2000] OJ L 160 at art 12.
Lynn M LoPucki. "The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in
International Bankruptcy" (2000) 98 Mich L Rn 2216 [LoPucki].
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applying were expressly acknowledged and respected by
clarifying that distribution would be locally governed as a
distinct stage subsequent to allocation. 52 Whether this
bifurcation was as territorialism-vindicating as might appear
on first blush remains to be seen.
vi. Summarr
To summarize. the Nortel cross-border bankruptcy was
resolved by a consensual, worldwide sale of the enterprise's
valuable business lines and then its residual portfolio of patents
and intellectual property in a highly coordinated and
productive manner. Surely related to this congenial approach
was an agreement by protocol to defer the thorny question of
proceeds allocation until after the sales had all been completed,
and even to try to mediate that question to further consensual
resolution. When that mediation failed, the parties proceeded
to litigate the matter. as provided by their protocol, before the
Canadian and US bankruptcy courts. Those courts conducted
a highly coordinated and cooperative joint trial, complete with
simultaneous video feeds, containing dozens of witnesses and
even more lawyers running around.
Eventually, the courts came to the same conclusion: reject all
the parties' arguments and allocate the lockbox proceeds on a
modified pro rclfa approach. Pro rata because the allocation
would be in proportion to the amount of claiming creditors in
each estate, counting inter-creditor claims in the pot, and
modified because only the lockbox assets and not, eg, the cash
on hand, would be allocated accordingly. The modified pro rata
allocation approach, however, did not speak to ultimate
distribution, which would be determined, d la territorialism,
in accordance with the substantive bankruptcy laws of each
respective jurisdiction receiving an allocation.
52

/11 re Nortel Ner1rnrks. Inc, 532 BR at 554: "All claims against each
Nortel Debtor. including intercompany claims and court approved
settlements. will receive distributions from the separate Debtor
Estates.": Re Nortel Netll'orks Corp. 2015 CarswellOnt 7072 (Ont
SCJ [Commercial List]). paras 250-51.
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The ultimate resolution of the Nortel assets thus has a
stinctly
territorialist flair to it. Recognizing the separate
di
estates and vindicating an implicit. and at times explicit.
presumption that creditors in each estate were entitled to claim
the assets within their physical jurisdiction. either ah initio or
through allocation from the lockbox, seems to have reflected a
territorialist mindset to the distribution question
notwithstanding the happy coordination that occurred to get
to that stage. And certainly the openly hostile digs at
universalism made by at least one of the Courts augments the
interpretation that the decisions were attempting to follow
territorialism. But that assessment belies the full significance of
the opinions. The Nortel case should be seen not as ultimately
backsliding into territorialist conceptions of vested right but as
actually moving the universalism ball forward. and
considerably so.
Ill. NORTEL'S UNIVERSALISM

Properly viewed, Nortel should be seen as a significant step
forward for universalism, notwithstanding its first-blush
territorialist focus on estate-by-estate distribution. There are
at least five ways in which it is accurate to characterize the
decision as importantly. although far from completely.
universalist.
1. Universalist Cooperation

At the risk of stating the obvious, the courts worked very
hard and very well together to synchronize their hearings and
avoid the risk of inconsistent judgments that had plagued
earlier cases like Lemout & Hauspie. Things were not all smooth
sailing, of course. For example, at one stage in the case the
Canadian bankruptcy court issued an order clarifying that
prosecution of administrative proceedings for a so-called
"financial support directive" in favour of UK pension
claimants under section 96 of the Pensions Act 2004 in the
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UK would constitute a violation of the Canadian automatic
stay. 53 The UK pension authorities cheerfully ignored this
order and went ahead to take the initial steps to determine
potential pension liability anyway. 54 But all in all, the
procedural integration of the co-trials, and not just the
allocation trials, but indeed the whole proceedings, was
commendable and a source of judicial statesmanship.
Fair enough: back-slapping all around. But is this a credit to
universalism? After all, deeply sovereignty-conscious states can
bask in territorialism yet nonetheless still be cordial and even
cooperative with judicial colleagues in cross-border disputes
without having to carry the banner of universalism. 55 Thus, to
be strictly precise, one might celebrate the profound degree of
cooperation in the case not so much as a victory for
universalism per se but as a victory for the Model Law and
similar instruments that strive for increased judicial dialogue,
communication, and cooperation. 56 Captured by its protocol,
the Nortel case unquestionably illustrates a high point of cross
border judicial cooperation.
One can take the next step, however, and claim that that
cooperation in turn services the broader goals of universalism
because it forces a necessary consideration of legal pluralism by
counseling an otherwise autonomous judge to at least confer
with an extra-territorial, indeed, extra-sovereign, peer. 57 Given
that one of the conceptual cornerstones of universalism is the
53
54
55
56
57

Re! Nortel N<!t11·or/...1· Corp. 2010 ONSC 1304 (Ont SCJ [Commercial
List]).
Re! NmNI N<!11rork.1 Corp. 2015 ONSC 4170 (Ont SCJ [Commercial
List]) at para 53.
Sec for example. LoPucki. supra note 51, arguing for "cooperative"
territorialism.
Model Law, supra note 5. arts 25-27: CoCo Guidelines. supra note
22.
Sec for example. US Ba11kruptc_r Code. supra note 7, § 1508: "In
interpreting this chapter. the court shall consider its international
origin, and the need to promote an application of this chapter that is
consistent with the application of similar statutes adopted by
foreign jurisdictions.··

acceptance of outcome differences and given further that
incrementalist universalists have predicted an acclimation
process whereby increased interaction and immersion in
foreign law will desensitize judges to any reflexive resistance
to the application of foreign law that universalism requires, it is
a fair conclusion that the working together of the two courts in
the two countries highlights a cosmopolitan mindset that will
advance, even if just conceptually or atmospherically, the
universalist agenda. 58
There is a further, inferential point regarding the importance
of the procedural cooperation in this case and others, and that is
the possibility that procedural integration increased the
likelihood or perhaps otherwise played a causal role in the
substantive determination on the allocation question. That is.
although the judges insisted strongly they were coming to their
own independent conclusions on the proper approach, surely
the regular interaction between them allowed them some
opportunity to exchange thoughts and ideas on a novel
question of cross-border insolvency law. Who else, other than
law clerks and the occasional professor, do judges get to bat
ideas around with besides other judges? It should shock nobody
that two judges working so closely together just so happened to
come to the same solution on allocation, especially one that
transcended the self-serving approaches of each respective
national constituency. 59
Importantly, it is not as if these two jurists were free from
differences of legal opinion. Indeed, a bizarrely long portion of
each judgment is devoted to interpretation of the tax-animated
Master Research and Development Agreement ("M RDA"). It
is bizarre because both courts ultimately held it largely
58
59

Jay L Westbrook. "Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies:
Choice of Law and Choice. of Forum.. ( 1991). 65 Am Ba11kr L J 457:
Pottow... ,ncremcntalism . . supra note 3 at 988-92.
Sec for example. Elizabeth Warren C!t al. ThC' Llrn· of' DC'htors &
Creditors: Text. Casi!.\' and Prohl(!l11s 914, 7'h cd (Aspen Publishers.
2014). discussing this aspect of the famous Ma.nre/1 Comm1111irn
tio11s case.
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irrelevant to the allocation decision, and the two courts
diverged significantly in their analyses. 60 The focus on the
M RDA interpretation could be professional path-dependency,
if!, that so much argument was devoted to the interpretation of
this agreement that the courts felt the need to respond to these
arguments and offer their interpretations of the document. Or it
could be that the courts, mindful of the novelty of their
proposed pro rnta allocation, where fleshing out alternative
conclusions of law in anticipation of the inevitable onslaught of
appeals. 61 Whatever the reason, each court went out of its way
to remark how it disagreed with the other court on the proper
interpretation of the agreement. 62 The Canadian court put
more emphasis on legal title of the licensed property, decrying
··economic theory'', whereas the US court put more emphasis
on what it saw as the economic substance of the location of all
60

61

62

Over 13 pages. Judge Gross rejected the Canadian debtors'
argument that the MRDA gave them ownership of the IP and
subsequent IP sales proceeds. 111 re Nortel Netll'orks, Inc, 532 BR
494, 538 (Bankr D Del 12 May 2015). Rather. the US court looked
to Nortel's representations to tax authorities and its enforcement
and sublicensing practices to find that the MRDA gave the US
debtors and the EMEA debtors economic and beneficial ownership,
and thus shared ownership. of the IP. /hid at 540-47. Across the
border and over 23 pages, the Canadian court found that while
under the M RDA, the Canadian debtors had complete ownership
of the IP subject to exceptions. it joined the US court in ultimately
concluding that the MRDA itself was not controlling on the
question of allocation of the IP sales proceeds, Re Nortel Networks
Corp. 2015 CarswellOnt 7072 (Ont SCJ [Commercial List]), paras
169, 171. because ··[t]he M RDA was an operating agreement and
was not intended to. nor did it. deal with the disposal of all Nortel's
assets in a situation in which no revenue was being earned and no
profit or losses were occurring... /hid at para 172.
See for example. US Debtors· Motion for Clarification and/or
Reconsideration of the 12 May 2015 Allocation Trail Opinion and
Order. /11 re Nortel Nefll"orks. Inc. 532 BR 494 (Bankr D Del 12
May 2015) (No 09-10138) (0kt No 15611).
As the US Court candidly conceded "The Courts have different
.
interpretations of the MORA."" Ill re Nortel Nefll"orks, Inc. 532 BR
at 532.
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meaningful legal rights to exploit a profit lying at the hands of
6,
the I.1censees. ·
Perhaps the length of the discussion on this ultimately moot
issue was simply a manifestation of two judges who had grown
to respect each other trying to make their best case, forcefully
but politely, for why the other was mistaken when they agreed
on so much else. However, there is another, more strategic
possibility that could be complementary to the foregoing
explanation. It could be that the judges were showing the world
that they were not just deciding everything in lockstep but that
they could, and did, disagree on matters. Perhaps they wanted
the bankruptcy world to know that the courts were not simply
two like-minded jurists who lucked into co-assignment but two
judges working together who felt no reservation about
expressing differences of opinion when necessary. But when
the ultimate question had to be resolved, however, they came
together and reached the same result. Given some of the
scolding regarding the protracted state of the litigation, 64 it
could well be that they aligned as a united front to make clear
that this matter had to end, once and for all, and to send a strong
signal that they were willing to do so even as judges who could
disagree on other matters. In that regard, it is eminently fair to
surmise that that convergence of outcome may well have been
facilitated by the universalism-fostering cooperation and
coordination of judicial proceedings that led to the mutual
acceptance of a goal to end this nightmare and try to blunt the
appetite for appeals by uniting with the same substantive
decision. Procedural coordination may thus have affected
substantive convergence.
63
64

See supra note 60.
The parties· complex arguments for their pos1t1ons and against
others [sic) supported by the enormous volume of supporting papers
go around and around without end and without a definitive correct
answer. It is fair to find that there is validity and error in all of the
arguments, largely because the arguments are not rooted in an
agreement which applies to the facts.
In re Nortel Netirnrks. fllc. 532 BR at 550.
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2. Universal Allocation Offsetting Territorial Distribution
In earlier academic work, I have discussed the role of, and
distinction between, two vectors of territorialism, somewhat
provocatively labeled "greed" and "pride". 65 These refer to
the two concerns that territorialists have regardin g
universalism's encroachment on so-called "local interests".
"Pride" is likely the more intractable and pertains to the
sovereignty-conscious desire to see a nation's normatively
rich bankruptcy laws apply to assets within that jurisdiction's
borders. Thus, if a given country has a high priority ranking
for labour claims, it is a hard swallow for many to send locally
situated assets to a foreign main bankruptcy proceeding afoot
in an M BE's COM I, where that priority will not be recognized,
all while local workers sit in the courtroom and look forlornly
at the local judge. 66 The "exportation" of the COMi's
bankruptcy laws upon the assets in the local jurisdiction
affronts sovereignty or, more cynically, upsets the rent
seeking divisions painstakingly inserted into local bankruptcy
law. 67
"Greed", by contrast, refers to good, old-fashioned local
favouritism and depends on the asset coverage ratio of locally
situated assets to cover local claims. Following the example
65

66

67

Pottow. ··Greed and Pride··. supra note 21; see also Sohsuke
Takahashi. "'The Reality of the Japanese Legal System for Cross
Border Insolvency
Driven by Fear of Universalism" (14 March
2011) [unpublished. on file with the International Insolvency
Institute]. at 67-72. discu�sing the cognate concept of --rear".
It is very difficult for a court in Country B to tell a group of
Country B employee:,, who have worked in a branch office in
Country B for years that they will not enjoy the special priority
distribution rule accorded to workers under Country B's bank
ruptcy law:,,. even though there arc plentiful assets in Country B to
cover such a payout. because their employer's bankruptcy will be
governed under the law:,, of Country A. which grants no such
priority.
Pottow. "'lncrcmcntalism··. supra note 3 at 951.
Sec Frederick Tung. "'Fear of Commitment in International Bank
ruptcy" (200 I). 33 Gro Wash Int ·1 L Rr,, 555. 566 n44.
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above, local unsecured creditors with no priority couldn't care
less about sovereignty and would be happy with a universalist
outcome that destroyed the priority of their employee-creditor
rivals under local law. Indeed, this is what happened in Lemout
& Hawpie. 68 All these creditors care about is sharing the
greatest amount of assets with the fewest number of creditors.
So "greed" refers to the desire of creditors with a high ratio of
local assets covering local claims not to share on a worldwide
basis when to do so would dilute their dividend, irrespective of
governing bankruptcy law. The reason greed is a less stable
territorialist vector than pride is because it is generally only
ascertainable ex post. No country can generally know ex ante
how creditors in its jurisdiction will shake out in the asset
scramble until there is an actual bankruptcy. Policymakers
might hope that creditors within their jurisdictions will
routinely be in "surplus" situations, in which the ratio of
local assets to local claims beats the worldwide average, such
that territorialism is attractive. Yet there is just as much chance
that their creditors will find themselves in a '"deficit" situation,
in which case the local creditors will welcome universalism's
worldwide sharing. 69
Viewing Nortel through this lens, it is clear that sovereignty
was alive and well: pride, though checked by cooperation, was
prevalent. This conclusion is supported by the courts' pointed
insistence on distinguishing between allocation and
distribution, with the latter being expressly reserved for the
respective sovereign jurisdictions to vindicate their policy
laden distribution rules and thus assuage their pride. As
mentioned above, this puts a territorialist gloss on the Nortel
proceedings. 70
On the other hand, greed was roundly, if not explicitly.
quashed, striking a universalist blow against the insistence, ex
68
69
70

/11 rr Lrmout & Hauspir Sperch Prods, NV. 301 BR 651,655 (Bankr
D Del 2003).
See Pottow. --Greed and Pride". supra note 21 at 1912-15.
See supra note 49.
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post, of course, that creditors with a winning asset coverage
ratio within a domestic territory have a "right" to collection
from assets within their local jurisdiction. Consider the
counterfactual of what a "greedy" territorialist allocation
would have looked like: each group of domestic creditors would
have insisted on its rights to have each asset situated within a
specific jurisdiction seized and distributed according to local
law, not sent off to global sharing under universalism. If Nortel
were following traditional territorialism, the litigation would
have been simple: nothing more than a fight about ll'here, ie, in
which territory, the intellectual property assets were located,
not, as it actually was, !uJII' to distribute the intellectual property
sales proceeds most equitably. 71
To be sure. there is some conceptual overlap, because the
outcome in Nortel might conceivably be explained by
concluding that the courts tried at first to answer the
"where" question, found it unanswerable, and then just
settled for the hands-throwing-up answer "everywhere", a
territorialist methodology that yielded a universalist-seeming
result. But that analysis is too quick, because if the courts were
truly hell-bent on a territorialist asset-situation fight and
nothing more, they would have winnowed down the patent
location shortlist to Canada vs. the United States. Either the
intellectual property assets were in Canada, where they were
nominally owned, as one predicts would have been the strong
presumptive territorialist argument, or at best they could have
been said to be in the United States, on a pragmatic, economic
functionalism argument that much of the profitable substance
71

.. [T]he Court is attempting to apply an equitable result where parties
could not agree upon one and did not prove the validity of any one
of the conflicting views... In re Nortel Net1rorks. Inc. 532 BR 494,
556 (Bankr D Del 12 May 2015); ··1t would unjustly enrich NNL to
deprive all of the other RPEs of the work that they did in creating
the IP just because the patents were registered in NNL's name."' Re
Nortel Nenrorks Corp. 2015 CarswellOnt 7072 (Ont SCJ [Commer
cial List]). para 197.
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of the assets occurred through the exploitation of the licenses
7">
located there.
Yet that is not what happened, far from it. Either recognizing
the deleterious effects of incentivizing the territorialism lottery
or simply acknowledging the inequity of such a result when
applied to a truly integrated M BE like Nortel. both courts
moved quickly beyond trying to figure out where the
underlying assets "'were" in allocating the proceeds of their
sale. Rather, they appreciated what universalism advocates
have maintained all along, that centralized administration and
sharing of an insolvent multinational's assets ultimately is the
most efficient and fair way to process a bankruptcy regardless
of assets' territorial location. 73 If territorialism were to rule the
day, the EMEA arguments would have been blown out of the
water; the fact that there was international R&D contribution
to the generation of the value-capturing intellectual property
assets would have been interesting from a Marxist perspective
but legally irrelevant. In fact, as soon as the Canadian formalist
approach was rejected, it was clear the courts were moving
beyond territorialism, which necessarily means, toward
universalism. 74
The final nail in the coffin of territorialist explanations of the
asset allocation comes in the courts' rejection of the intriguing
72
73

74

See for example In re Nortel Net1rorks. Inc. 532 BR at 555.
preferring economic approach.
It was not one corporation and one set of employees inventing IP
that led to patents. Nortel was a highly integrated multi-national
enterprise with all RPEs doing R&D that led to patents being
granted. It was R&D that drove Nortel's business. R&D and the
intellectual property created from it was the primary driver of
Nortel's value and profits. All parties agree on that. It would
unjustly enrich NNL to deprive all of the other RPEs of the work
that they did in creating the IP just because the patents were
registered in NNL"s name.
Re Nortel Net1rnrkl· Corp. 2015 CarswcllOnt 7072. para 197.
'Territorial wrangling significantly diminishes value for stakehold
ers in a global insolvency involving a highly-integrated multi
national enterprise whose assets arc entangled. and ought not to be
condoned or rewarded."" In re Nortel Net1rorks. Inc. 532 BR at 531.
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reliance arguments made by the guaranteed bondholders.
Some bondholders holding inter-corporate guarantees
essentially claimed that they were entitled to supra-pro-rata
recovery because they purchased their bonds in reliance on
accessing multiple potential bankruptcy estates through the
guarantees should the bonds default, ie, pro rata in one estate
for their primary bond claims and then pro rata again in another
for their inter-corporate guarantees. 75
This purported reliance led to a barrage of yield-spread
graphs pored over by the courts and even more interesting
expert testimony concerning whether there is actually any
appreciable difference in bond yields for inter-corporate
guaranteed versus non-guaranteed debt. 76 Without jumping
into the dispute, it is worth noting the courts' ultimate rejection
of the suggestion that settled expectations would somehow be
undermined by sticking with the pro rata allocation formula
given the demonstrated non-reliance of the parties. Even more
remarkable is the courts' ultimate questioning whether there is
ever actual reliance on inter-corporate guarantees, for there was
serious discussion in both courts of the insolvency-state
11Te
. Ievtmce o f.inter-corporate guarantees.1 77
The case should not be overstated, of course, because
although ignored for pro rnta allocation purposes, the
guarantees were nonetheless preserved to buttress multiple
possible claims at the distribution stage. Still. the foundation of
territorialism's vested rights argument, namely, hypothetical
75
76
77

/hid at 559: Re Nortel Netil'Orks Corp. 2015 CarswellOnt 7072, para

229.

/11 re Nortel Net1rnrks. Inc. 532 BR at 559: Re Nortel Netll'orks Corp,
2015 CarswcllOnt 7072 at para 239.
··The guarantee� did not restrict NNC or its subsidiaries from
lending cash to. or making investments in. affiliates, or from
incurring sub�tantial amounts of additional indebtedness investors
were w;rned of the possibility of consolidation, and that under
applicable law principal and interest might not be paid. Thus, the
Bondholders· allegations of reliance on the outcome they now
advocate arc unfounded [sic] ... In re Nortel Netll'orks. Inc. 532 BR at
559.
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presumed reliance, suffered serious and overdue destabilization
in looking at the actual reliance on the guarantee by the parties
in this case. 78
3. Nortefs Specific Application: Near-Universalism
While perhaps not as significant as the prior two aspects of
Nortel's universalist leanings, the specific application of the
courts' holdings to mimic what a universalist result would look
like is still important. That is because even though the courts'
insistence on distribution by estate invoked the pride
component of territorial concern over local interests, the
actual application of that distribution in this case suggests that
that pride will be minimally disruptive, almost trivial. In the
facts of this particular case, there were no secured creditors
claiming the lockbox proceeds. and the biggest potential
candidate for an unsecured priority claim, the UK pension
claimants, had been adjudicated not to have priority but
general unsecured status (those claims to be fixed by UK
proceedings). 79 If priority. especially the nettlesome priority of
security, is stripped out of a case. then pro rata allocation by
estate merges into universalism.
Running some numbers might help substantiate this
assertion. Sticking with the earlier hypothetical. 80 consider
the situation in which$1 of claims in Canada and$l in EMEA
each compete with $2 of claims in the US. Under pro rata
allocation, the lockbox proceeds would be disbursed 25%,
25%, 50% to Canada, EMEA, and the US. It does not matter
what the underlying assets are; they could be valued at X. Now
78

79
80

See John A E Pottow. "Beyond Carve-Outs and Toward Reliance:
A Normative Framework for Cross-Border Insolvency Choice of
Law" (2014), 9 Brook J Corp Fin & Com L 197. arguing that only
actual reliance rather than presumed reliance based on conjectured
expectations should generally justify departure from COMI bank
ruptcy rules.
Re Nortel Netll'orks Corp. 2015 ONSC 4170 (Ont SCJ [Commercial
List]) at para 54.
See supra note 33.
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appreciate what would happen under territorialism, and to do
so easily, assume that all the assets are located in Canada.
Under a territorialist regime where creditors can only file in
one estate. which is not necessarily the case with sophisticated
creditors but is the approach implicitly assumed in the Nortel
courts' dispo�ition.x 1 the outcome would entail all the money
going to the Canadian creditors. with the rest getting zero. On a
purely universalist regime, however, everyone would file in
Canada. or at least file in ancillary proceedings that defer to
Canada,'X')- and all the assets would be sent there for
distribution. under Canadian law, although under this
hypothetical they are already there. Under this universalist
outcome. the Canadians would take 25% of X, EMEA 25% of
X, and the US 50% of X, exactly matching the pro rata
allocation approach.

law is muted if not eliminated. For in the absence of any priority
creditors, and a fortiori the absence of any relevance of
differences in substantive bankruptcy distribution laws, the
pro rata allocation approach will indeed merge fully into
universalism. The application of Canadian "vs." US laws for
distribution will be of no moment, and so the bifurcation of
allocation and distribution will be irrelevant. Thus.
protestations notwithstanding, the courts in Nortel have
almost ordered what universalism would look like in this
actual case, and the world has not stopped spinning.8 J To be
sure, they were not at full universalism -recall the "modified"
approach left cash on hand territorially in the local estates but they got pretty close.

The universalist outcome is not necessarily congruent with
the pro rata allocation approach, however, because of
redistributive hankruptc_r priorities. Under the pro rata
allocation approach. assets are sent to the respective
jurisdictions to be distributed under each local jurisdiction's
bankruptcy laws. whereas under universalism, the distribution
would be effected by a Canadian court under Canadian
bankruptcy laws. But the principal relevance of distribution
laws is whether they confer different priorities and rankings for
creditors that would make the choice of distribution law
relevant, ie, creating some winners and some losers depending
on whose laws applied. In this specific case, however, with no
secured claims and the UK pension claimants being non
priority, that potential "distortion" of choice of distribution

In ordering the modified pro rata allocation of the Nortel
assets, the courts intermittently circled back to words like
''extraordinary" or "unique" to describe both Nortel and their
novel solution.84 And in one sense, they were surely correct:
Nortel is unique in its worldwide cooperation of an asset sale of
billions of dollars, as it might also be unique in its magnitude of
squabbling over the distribution of those proceeds.85 It's a big,

81

82

"In determining what the claims against a Debtor Estates [sic] are, a
claim that can be made against more than one Debtor Estate can
only be calculated and recognized once... Re Nortel Networks Corp,
2015 CarswellOnt 7072. para 251; see also Jay Lawrence West
brook. ··Universal Participation in Transnational Bankruptcies", in
Ross Cranston. ed. Making Commercial Lml': E.rn1_rs i11 Honour of
Ray Gornie (Oxford: Clarendon Pres�. 1997) 419. 436-37 (discussing
"universal crm,�-filing .. ).
See Pottov.. "lncrementalism". rnprn note 3 at 947.

4. Universalism's ''Uniqueness" Not So One-Off as Protested

83

84

85

Most of the parties
save the plucky US interests
have not
appealed the allocation decision, although they have filed con
tingent cross-appeals if the US appeals are granted. The appellate
courts have rebuffed invitations to expedite these appeals. Gina
Passarella. "Nortel Bankruptcy Appeals Denied Fast Track to
Third Circuit". Delmr<tre Lmr Weekl_r (5 August 2015). online:
< http:, 1www.delawarclawweekly.com/id = 1202733834964 Nortel
Bankruptcy-A ppeals-Denied-Fast- Track-to- Third-Circui t'!slre
turn =20150905125146>.
.
"Pro rata is. to say the least. an extraordinary result. . /11 re Nortel
Netll'orks. Inc. 532 BR 494. 560 ( Bankr D Del 12 May 2015).
"[D]oing what is just in the unique circumstances of this case should
govern the allocation." Re Nortel Net1rorks Corp. 2015 CarswcllOnt
7072. para 204.
"The Court can only speculate why the parties. all represented by
the ablest of lawyers and sparing no expense. were unable to reach a
settlement on allocation... /11 re Nortel Netll'orks. "1c. 532 BR at 500.
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heady, headline-grabbing case, and thus unique in many
respects. But the courts' factual analyses of the workings of a
seething, cross-border behemoth reveal a business model that is
not nearly so one-off as characterizations such as extraordinary
and unique might imply. Quite the contrary, many of the
financial and human resource integration practices explained
by the courts seem like they could apply as descriptions of
countless other M BE. As the Canadian court summed up:
"[Nortel] was not one corporation and one set of employees
inventing IP that led to patents. Nortel was a highly integrated
multinational enterprise. " 86 So, too, did the US court find
functional integration.
[Principal),[ did not run the business with any real knowledge of the
�tatutory entitie� at all. . . . Decisions to allocate resources and
performances were not based on legal entity lines, but by lines of
bu�iness. Nortel reported its finances on a consolidated basis without
regard for it!'.> different legal entitie�...
Although employed by a particular legal entity. employee work
responsibilitie� were directed to the entire Nortel. ..

To the outside world. including Nortel's customers, suppliers, and the
rest of the world. the I corporate I logo referred to all of Nortel. and not to
·
any one geograph.1c enllty. 87

Whether Nortel was an exemplar or outlier in how it ran its
operations is of course an empirical question, but there is good
reason to suspect that Nortel's practices may be widespread.
And if Nortel was indeed something close to a typical MBE in
terms of its corporate interweaving of operations, then the case
for universalist allocation of sales proceeds may be less unique
86

87

Re None/ Net1rnrks Corp. 2015 CarswellOnt 7072 (Ont SCJ
[Commercial List]). para 197: ihid at para 218 (noting .. significant
intertwining of the debtor companies. including multiple instances
of inter-company debts. cross-default provisions and guarantees
and the. existence and operation of a centralized cash-management
system . ).
/11 re Nortl'I Net1rnrk.1·. Inc. 532 BR at 551-52.
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than suggested. Nortel may thus serve as a focal point of
salience for many future cross-border proceedings. further
advancing universalism with its asset-sharing approach.
5. The Primordial Allure of Universalism
The final way in which Nortel foments universalism is by
underscoring the simple point that sharingparipas.\·u is a deeply
ingrained construct in many insolvency systems around the
world. 88 It should thus startle few that when the courts threw
out the self-serving allocation proposals offered by the parties
and looked at the reality of the operational integration of the
Nortel empire, they decided to revert to first principles of
equality as equity. 89 It further shows the allure of universalism,
because wholly apart from its efficiency arguments, which are
normatively compelling, universalism fights back at what has
been referred to as the lottery aspect of territorialism. 90 Given
the ease with which some assets can move across borders, it
makes no sense to privilege asset location in spreading losses of
financially insolvent M BE debtors across creditors. 91 And,
indeed, the bond spread analysis of Nortel shows how weak the
"vested rights" arguments truly are that get trotted out to
defend the charged unfairness of the lottery. 92 While it is ironic
88
89
90

91

92

Sec Legislative Guide. supra note 44.
Modified by the cash on hand. to be sure. but still pro rato in the main.
As Lord Hoffmann for the Privy Council puts it best: .. [F]airncss
between creditors requires that. ideally. bankruptcy proceedings
should have universal application. There should be a single
bankruptcy in which all creditors arc entitled and required to
prove. No one should have an advantage because he happens to live
in a jurisdiction where more of the assets or fewer of the creditors
arc situated."" Camhridge Gas Tra11sporratio11 Corp 1· Q_tficial
Committee or U11.1·ernred Creditors or N(fl'igator Holdings pie.
(2006] 3 All ER 829. (2006] UKPC 26 (PC) at paras 13-15.
See for example. John A E Pottow... The Myth (and Realities) of
.
Forum Shopping in Transnational Insolvency . (2006). 32 Brook .I
Inrl L 785. discussing tcrritorialism·s facilitation of forum shopping
.
through asset night [Pottow... Myth (and Realities) . ].
.
Jay Lawrence Westbrook. . A Global Solution to Multinational
Default"' (2000). 9 8 Mich L Rei• 2276.
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at some level that the assets most territorially privileged in the
modified pro rara allocation approach in this case are the ones
most susceptible to cross-border territory shopping, namely,
cash, 93 the broader point remains that the unfairness of pinning
the creditors' dividend to the sometimes random location of
assets on bankruptcy day - the conceptual lynchpin of
territorialism - clearly weighed upon the judges in the case
of an integrated M BE when they crafted the pro rata approach.
Recall that the situation of the intellectual property in Canada
alone was for tax convenience. 94 As such, whether the courts
recognized they were being guided by universalist impulses or
not, the equality norm of bankruptcy law, and its
implementation through a universalist approach to cross
border proceedings, was strongly on display in Nortel.

IV. CONCLUSION
Nortel was a remarkable display of judicial cooperation and
innovation, designing the nuanced and novel approach of
modified pro rata allocation of the proceeds of a globally
integrated insolvency sales procedure. Although the focus on
estate-by-estate distribution of this pro-rated allocation might
at first blush seem territorialist, properly viewed in context,
Nortel is actually a considerable illustration and advancement
of universalism. Nortel is far from a full-throated clarion cry for
universalism, however, so at most two cheers can be mustered
and not a full three. 95 But universalism is likely only to be
reached along an incrementalist path anyway, 96 and Norte/has
moved the ball forward. In their own way, perhaps covertly,
93
94
95

96

Sec Pottow ... Myth (and Realities)". supra note 90.
Sec supra note 60.
This territorial backslide can be seen. for example. by the
modification to the pro rata approach. the vocal protestations that
it was neither �ubstantive consolidation nor universalism. and the
aforementioned fixation on territorial estates. In re Nortel Net
works. Ille. 532 BR at 550. 558. 538; Re Nortel Netll'orks Corp, 2015
CarswellOnt 7072 (Ont SCJ [Commercial List]) at paras 88, 212.
Pottow. --1ncrcmcntali!>m". supra note 3.
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perhaps subconsciously, perhaps unintentionally, or perhaps
simply judiciously, the Nortel judges in their two different
jurisdictions with their two coordinated and harmonious
opinions have shown how universalism can work and how its
allure remains strong.

